United States v. Jason Eugene Mincy -Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati

Circuit 6Nov 24, 2025

Split Score

SplitScore: 81/100

Case Summary

Disposition

Affirmed

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to dismiss a superseding indictment that raised Jason Mincy’s sentencing exposure after he filed a suppression motion, finding no presumptive or actual prosecutorial vindictiveness. The court also declined to address Mincy’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal, leaving that issue for a future § 2255 motion.

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Circuit Split Identified

Legal Issue

Whether a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness may arise from a prosecutor’s decision to file additional or more serious charges during the pre-trial / plea-bargaining stage (e.g., after a defendant files a suppression motion or declines a plea offer).

Circuit Positions

Circuit 1Circuit 2Circuit 3Circuit 4Circuit 5Circuit 7Circuit 9Circuit 10Circuit 11

Pre-trial charging decisions (including superseding indictments after failed plea talks or suppression motions) do NOT trigger a presumption of vindictive prosecution.

Circuit 6(this circuit)

A presumption of vindictiveness can arise in the pre-trial context when the government adds more serious charges following a defendant’s exercise of procedural rights.

Conflict Summary

Most circuits hold that the presumption of vindictiveness does NOT apply to pre-trial charging decisions made during plea negotiations, reasoning that such decisions are part of the ordinary give-and-take of criminal litigation. By contrast, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that the presumption can arise pre-trial when the government increases charges after a defendant files certain motions, thereby treating such actions as potentially retaliatory under the Due Process Clause.

Parties & Counsel

Parties

Appellant:Jason Eugene Mincy
Appellee:United States of America