Circuit Split Alerter

Whether §10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act permits the NLRB to award consequential ‘direct or foreseeable pecuniary’ damages (the Thryv make-whole remedy) beyond traditional equitable relief such as reinstatement with back-pay.

Whether a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging immigration detention qualifies as an EAJA “civil action,” thereby waiving federal sovereign immunity for attorneys’-fee awards.

Whether § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA imposes a heightened ‘materially misleading’ accuracy standard on furnishers (requiring them to avoid technically accurate yet misleading credit information) or only a ‘technical accuracy’ standard.

Whether a plaintiff challenging a facially-neutral, even-handedly applied government policy under the Equal Protection Clause must show BOTH discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact (dual-prong test) or whether proof of discriminatory purpose alone suffices to trigger strict scrutiny.

Whether victims may recover attorneys’ fees as “other expenses” under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.

Whether a defendant who has pleaded guilty and is participating in a state diversion/deferred-adjudication program remains "under indictment" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) and the corresponding U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 prohibited-person enhancement.

Whether U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2’s commentary can expand the definition of a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense” to include inchoate offenses (attempt, conspiracy, aiding and abetting) when those offenses are not enumerated in the guideline text itself.

Whether Application Note 3(C) to USSG § 2S1.1 limits the two-level money-laundering enhancement in § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) when the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and the sole object is an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, even when the base-offense level is determined under § 2S1.1(a)(1).

Whether state Protection-and-Advocacy (P&A) organizations created under the PAIMI Act possess associational standing to sue on behalf of their statutory constituents despite lacking traditional members.

Whether the use of entirely subjective criteria in hiring decisions, standing alone, permits an inference of pretext sufficient to defeat summary judgment in employment-discrimination cases.

Proper constitutional framework for evaluating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after NYSRPA v. Bruen—whether the statute is categorically valid for all felons or subject to as-applied challenges and, if so, what methodology governs those challenges.

Whether a Notice to Appear (NTA) that omits the time and date of the initial immigration hearing is a jurisdictional defect that deprives the immigration court of subject-matter jurisdiction, or merely a mandatory claims-processing requirement that can be cured by a later Notice of Hearing.

Whether, under Erie, the classification of an issue as a question of law versus a question of fact is governed by state substantive law (thereby making the issue one for the court) or by federal procedural law (thereby potentially allocating it differently).

Whether the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4)(A) automatically applies to images depicting a minor’s self-penetration (per se rule) or whether courts must make a case-by-case, objective determination that the image portrays sadistic, masochistic, or otherwise violent conduct.

Whether the “newly-discovered evidence” gateway in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) / § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) authorizes successive habeas petitions that challenge a death sentence (as opposed to only the underlying conviction).