Circuit Split Alerter

Whether dual, for-cause removal protections for agency Administrative Law Judges (and related questions of being subjected to proceedings before such ALJs) violate Article II and/or warrant preliminary injunctive relief.

Whether, in an interlocutory appeal under Federal Arbitration Act § 16(a)(1), the court of appeals may review the district court’s determination of Article III standing (subject-matter jurisdiction).

Whether the word “and” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) is read conjunctively (defendant must meet all three criminal-history disqualifiers to be ineligible) or disjunctively (any one disqualifier bars safety-valve relief).

Whether, in a supervised-release revocation sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), a district court may consider the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor of "promoting respect for the law / providing just punishment."

Whether a supervised-release condition barring a defendant from associating with anyone the defendant knows or should know is a gang “associate” is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.

Whether U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) requires proof that the defendant was subjectively aware of the risk of death or serious bodily injury (subjective-awareness test) or whether it is enough that the risk would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the defendant’s position (objective-reasonableness test).

Whether §10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act permits the NLRB to award consequential ‘direct or foreseeable pecuniary’ damages (the Thryv make-whole remedy) beyond traditional equitable relief such as reinstatement with back-pay.

Whether a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging immigration detention qualifies as an EAJA “civil action,” thereby waiving federal sovereign immunity for attorneys’-fee awards.

Whether § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA imposes a heightened ‘materially misleading’ accuracy standard on furnishers (requiring them to avoid technically accurate yet misleading credit information) or only a ‘technical accuracy’ standard.

Whether a plaintiff challenging a facially-neutral, even-handedly applied government policy under the Equal Protection Clause must show BOTH discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact (dual-prong test) or whether proof of discriminatory purpose alone suffices to trigger strict scrutiny.

Whether victims may recover attorneys’ fees as “other expenses” under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.

Whether a defendant who has pleaded guilty and is participating in a state diversion/deferred-adjudication program remains "under indictment" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) and the corresponding U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 prohibited-person enhancement.

Whether U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2’s commentary can expand the definition of a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense” to include inchoate offenses (attempt, conspiracy, aiding and abetting) when those offenses are not enumerated in the guideline text itself.

Whether Application Note 3(C) to USSG § 2S1.1 limits the two-level money-laundering enhancement in § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) when the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and the sole object is an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, even when the base-offense level is determined under § 2S1.1(a)(1).

Whether state Protection-and-Advocacy (P&A) organizations created under the PAIMI Act possess associational standing to sue on behalf of their statutory constituents despite lacking traditional members.